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Abstract
In this paper, we review the state of the art of privacy-preserving schemes for ad hoc social networks, including, mobile
social networks (MSNs) and vehicular social networks (VSNs). Specifically, we select and in-detail examine thirty-three privacy-
preserving schemes developed for or applied in the context of ad hoc social networks. These schemes are published between 2008
and 2016. Based on this existing privacy preservation schemes, we survey privacy preservation models, including location privacy,
identity privacy, anonymity, traceability, interest privacy, backward privacy, and content oriented privacy. The recent important
attacks of leaking privacy, countermeasures, and game theoretic approaches in VSNs and MSNs are summarized in form of tables.
In addition, an overview of recommendations for further research is also provided. With this survey, readers can have a more
thorough understanding of research trends in privacy-preserving schemes for ad hoc social networks.
Index Terms
Security, Privacy preservation, Ad hoc social network, Mobile social network, Vehicular social network
I. INTRODUCTION
AWIRELESS AD-HOC network consists of mobile platforms which are free to communicate without any central controlentity [1]. It can operate in an isolated manner or with fixed networks through gateways. The power of an ad hoc network
is that it does not differentiate between a router and a station, i.e., each station contributes to routing. Mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs) and vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are special cases of ad hoc networks. The MANET is an autonomous
system of mobile nodes, which has several salient characteristics, namely, dynamic topologies, bandwidth-constrained and
energy constrained operation, and limited physical security [2], [3]. The VANET is a special case of MANET, where the
mobile nodes are instantiated with vehicles equipped with On-board Unit (OBU) communication devices [4].
Today, in our daily lives, social networking enables us to contact our colleagues, friends, and families through applications
such as Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin, Google+, YouTube, and ResearchGate. At the same time, however, ad hoc social networks
are getting increasingly important which it takes the human factors into consideration, i.e., human mobility, human selfish status,
and human preferences [5], [6], [7], [8]. In this survey, we focus on two types of ad hoc social networks, including, mobile
social networks (MSNs) and vehicular social networks (VSNs). Tab. I gives a comparison between ad hoc network (MANET,
VANET) and ad hoc social network (MSN, VSN) in terms of node, mobility, connectivity, resource, architecture, scalability,
application, typical research issue, and security.
Fig. 1. A global architecture of Ad Hoc Social Network
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS
Ad hoc network Ad hoc social network
MANET VANET MSN VSN
Node Laptop,
smartphone, pocket
PC, router. . . etc
Vehicles Human Vehicles with social
properties
Mobility Random On-Road Human mobility On-Road with
socialspot
Connectivity Random Random and Inter-
mittent
Interest social Interest social
Resource Limited hardware
and power limited
by battery
Almost unlimited Limited hardware and
power limited by bat-
tery
Almost unlimited
Architecture Node-to-node Vehicle-to-vehicle,
Vehicle-to-RSU
Node-to-node , Node-
to-socialspot
Vehicle-to-vehicle,
Vehicle-to-RSU,
Vehicle-to-socialspot
Scalability 50-100 nodes Huge 50-100 nodes Huge
Application Military, disaster
(specific)
Safety, traffic, pay-
ment
Mobile social
applications, location-
based applications
Vehicular social
applications, location-
based applications
Typical
Research Issue
Routing Application Application Application
Security Sensitive Sensitive Highly-sensitive Highly-sensitive
TABLE II
PUBLICATION DATE BREAKDOWN - SURVEYED PAPERS
Paper Year Paper Year Paper Year
[9] 2008 [10] 2011 [11] 2013
[12] 2010 [13] 2011 [14] 2014
[15] 2010 [16] 2011 [17] 2014
[18] 2010 [19] 2012 [20] 2014
[21] 2010 [22] 2012 [23] 2015
[24] 2010 [25] 2012 [26] 2015
[27] 2011 [28] 2012 [29] 2016
[30] 2011 [31] 2012 [32] 2016
[33] 2011 [34] 2012 [35] 2016
[36] 2011 [37] 2013 [38] 2016
[39] 2011 [40] 2013 [41] 2016
As shown in Fig.1.a, MSN is composed of a set of mobile users U = {u1, · · · , un} with some socialspots S = {s1, · · · , sn}
in a city environment, which each user ui having equal communication range Rui [5], [7], [8]. Similarly to MSN, as shown in
Fig.1.b, a VSN is composed of a large number of vehicles V = {v1, · · · , vn} equipped with on-board units (OBUs), Roadside
Units (RSUs) and some socialspots S = {s1, · · · , sn} . Using the communication capabilities of their OBUs, the vehicles
can communicate with each other, as well as with RSUs and socialspot si, i.e., vehicle-to-vehicle (V-2-V) communication,
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V-2-I) communication, vehicle-to-socialspot (V-2-S) communication [6], [42]. These three types of
communications can happen using the wireless access technologies that are available today such as cellular systems (3G/4G/5G),
WLAN/Wi-Fi, WiMAX, and DSRC/WAVE [43].
Since the social characteristics are integrated into ad hoc networks, MAN and VSN have become very sensitive to security
and privacy compared with MANET and VANET. In other words, security issue is crucial to the full adoption of MSN and
VSN, especially for the privacy. Based on identities, pseudonyms, locations, and profiles, an adversary can launch active or
passive attacks (deliberately delays, drops, corrupts, or modifies messages) in order to steal the social data as well as to damage
the V-2-V, V-2-I, and V-2-S communications. Hence, in order to protect the social community, the privacy-preserving schemes
employed in MSNs and VSNs should satisfy the following security requirements: authentication, integrity, non-repudiation,
access control, and privacy [44].
In a recent survey paper which was published in 2016 [45] authors review the state of the art of privacy preserving techniques
for online social networks (OSNs). In addition, other recent surveys in [46] and [42] published in 2015 provide information
about applications, platforms, system architectures in MSNs and VSNs, respectively. Neither of the published, state-of-the-art
literature provide a comprehensive survey for recent advances in privacy-preserving schemes for MSNs and VSNs. The aim
of this survey paper is to provide comprehensive and systematic review of the recent studies on published privacy-preserving
schemes for ad hoc social networks, including, MSNs and VSNs. More precisely, we select and in-detail examine thirty-three
privacy-preserving schemes. See Tab. II for a breakdown of publication dates and Fig. 2 for the properties investigated.
The main contributions of this paper are:
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Fig. 2. Organization of surveyed papers
• We present various privacy preservation models for MSNs and VSNs, including, location privacy, identity privacy,
anonymity, traceability, interest privacy, backward privacy, and content oriented privacy.
• We provide a classification for the attacks of leaking privacy for MSNs and VSNs, including, identity-based attacks,
location-based attacks, eavesdropping-based attacks, manipulation-based attacks, and service-based attacks.
• We present various countermeasures and game theoretic approaches proposed for MSNs and VSNs.
• We present a side-by-side comparison in a tabular form for the current state-of-the-art of privacy-preserving schemes
(thirty-three) proposed for MSNs and VSNs.
• We present a discussion of recommendations for further research, namely, including, privacy preserving methods,
interdependent privacy, combination of privacy metrics, and identification of areas of vulnerability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents various privacy preservation models for MSNs and
VSNs. In Section III, we provide a classification for the attacks of leaking privacy for MSNs and VSNs. Section IV presents
various countermeasures and game theoretic approaches proposed for MSNs and VSNs. In sections V and VI, we present a
side-by-side comparison in a tabular form for the current state-of-the-art of privacy-preserving schemes proposed for MSNs
and VSNs, respectively. Finally, we discuss open issues and recommendations for further research in Section VII and draw
our conclusions in Section VIII.
TABLE III
PRIVACY-PRESERVING MODELS
Reference Data protected Model
[19], [32], [28], [39], [13], [16], [18],
[21], [29]
Location Location privacy
[19], [27], [33], [23], [20], [31], [36],
[15], [21]
ID Identity privacy
[37], [34], [11], [39], [10], [15], [16] ID location Anonymity
[47], [48], [49], [20], [31], [36] ID Traceability
[21], [30] Interest Interest privacy
[15] Backward Backward privacy
[40], [35], [41] All data in the network Content oriented privacy
[14], [30] All data in the network Trust evaluation
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II. PRIVACY PRESERVATION MODELS
As shown in Tab. III, the papers we review are all related with privacy preservation in ad hoc social networks, and could be
divided into location privacy, identity privacy, anonymity, traceability, interest privacy, backward privacy, and content oriented
privacy.
A. Location privacy
Location privacy is one of the most important models for privacy in VSNs and MSNs, since the place of equipment (mobile
phone or vehicle) can be linked to the owners. If a privacy-preserving scheme cannot guarantee the location privacy, users
will be skeptical and it cannot be accepted by the public. However, there are many solutions to ensure the location privacy in
MSNs and VSNs.
In MSNs, there are two papers dealing the location privacy [19], [32]. Liang et al. [19] proposes a proximity measurement
with morality-driven data forwarding. This method provides the location privacy by mixing the hotspot based on multiplying
a subgroup element. Li et al. [32] analyzes the disclosed locations [50] in the MSN applications and proposes a system-level
privacy control approach. This approach, via the decision tree model, it provides the privacy of location sharing in MSN.
In VSNs, there are seven papers dealing the location privacy [28], [39] [13], [16], [18], [21], [29]. Lu et al. [28] proposes
a strategy for the location privacy based on pseudonym self-delegated generation with conditional tracking. With this strategy,
when a vehicle changes its pseudonyms, the location privacy can be guaranteed. In the paper [39], the location privacy is
guaranteed using Lite-CA-based public key cryptosystem. According to Lin et al. [13], achieving receiver-location privacy
preservation can be guaranteed by the social-tier dissemination phase, where the social tier request vehicles to help forwarding
the packet to its neighboring social spots, and it shouldn’t degrade the packet delivery performance. Lu et al. [16] proposes
another technique based on pseudonyms changing at small social spot and large social spot. This technique, via anonymity
analysis, can provide a promising solution for the location privacy. Related to the method proposed from Lu et al. [16], the
author proposes an idea which vehicles periodically change multiple pseudo-IDs [21]. Lu et al. [18] proposes another idea
called “Sacrificing the Plum Tree for the Peach Tree”. This idea is a technique based on a collection of social spots for
protecting receiver-location privacy and improving the performance of packet forwarding. Yu et al. [29] proposes a scheme
based on a collection of social spots, including 1) global social spot and 2) individual social spot. These two types of social
spot exploit the meeting opportunities for pseudonym changing in order to improve the location privacy.
B. Identity privacy
Before ensuring the location privacy, it is necessary to reassure the identity privacy. This can be acheived if in order to place
of real identity, each equipment uses a pseudonym. There are many solutions which are based on concealing the real identity
to ensure the identity privacy in MSNs and VSNs.
In MSNs, there are four papers dealing the identity privacy [19], [27], [33], [23]. Note that there are techniques that provide
both identity and location privacy such as multiple-pseudonym technique [19]. Lu et al. [27] proposes an algorithm, called
Patient Joining, for achieving the real identity privacy by a pseudo-id. This algorithm is executed between the trusted authority
and patient and it outputs a pseudo-id. Liang et al. [33] addresses the identity privacy in an emergency situation by ensuring
unlinkability of the transactions and enhancing availability. Especially, in the emergency call generation phase, the user identity
is guaranteed using a group signature proposed in [51]. Zhang et al. [23] develop a personalized fine-grained filtering for the
identity privacy. This filtering is based on social-assisted filter distribution.
In VSNs, there are five papers dealing the identity privacy [20], [31], [36], [15], [21]. Chim et al. [20] support privacy-
preserving of the drivers. The identity privacy is preserved using two ideas, including 1) the idea of pseudo-identity and 2)
the idea of anonymous credential. Liang et al. [31] proposes an idea based on a tamper-proof device activation password,
which the RSU uses in order to verify the vehicle’s identity and sends its tamper-proof device an anonymous credential. The
trusted authority can reveal the real identity pf the vehicle to a third party for billing purposes. Chim et al. [36] proposes a
scheme that uses a different pseudo identity for each session. This scheme preserves the real identity based on the handshaking
phase, which is executed between RSU and the trusted authority. Sun et al. [15] analyzes the identity revocation based on
the certificate revocation list in order to exclude an unexpired membership. Based on the work presented in [20], Liang et al.
[31] presents the idea of pseudo-identity for ensuring identity privacy. Aiming to reduce the linkage between the identity and
location of vehicles, Yan et al. [52] propose a scheme that enhances the privacy using the idea of cell-based communication.
Authors view vehicular networks as consisting of non-overlapping sub-networks restricted to a geographic area referred to as
a cell. Each cell has a server that maintain a list of pseudonyms that can be assigned to the vehicles. Although the idea of
dividing the network is interesting and has been extensively used for clustering [53] and routing reasons, the existence of a
server in each area increases the cost of the solution and also makes it infeasible.
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C. Anonymity- Untraceability
Anonymity is an important security aspect of wireless communications, since it not only protects the privacy of the users but
also reduces the chances of attacks based on impersonation [54]. Untraceability is a related issue to anonymity, since if a user is
traceable, its hidden identity can be revealed through the profiling of user’s activity. Note that most of the anonymity schemes
use a public key infrastructure (PKI) [10]. For evaluating anonymity and protecting privacy, Sweeney et al. [55] proposes
the k-anonymity mode. Other interesting methods which are presented in the papers [56], [57], similar to the model in [55],
introduce the notions of sender and receiver k-anonymity. Specifically, Wang et al. [57] proposes a protocol, which ensures
the anonymous transmission in a Local Ring. Moreover, there is a recent work presented in the paper [37] that proposes a
profile matching protocol in MSNs, called PPM, for ensuring the anonymity (from conditional to full). The PPM protocol uses
three approaches, including, 1) explicit comparison-based approach, 2) implicit comparison-based approach, and 3) implicit
predicate-based approach. In addition, the PPM protocol uses two anonymity enhancing techniques, including, 1) anonymity
measurement and 2) anonymity enhancement.
In VSNs, there are six papers dealing the anonymity [34], [11], [39], [10], [15], [16]. Xiong et al. [34] proposes a protocol
that supports multi-level anonymity using the ring signature that was initialy presented in [58] and [59]. Based on a pseudo-ID
and anonymous certificate, Ying et al. [11] proposes an idea to provide the driver with a satisfactory degree of anonymity. In the
paper [39], the anonymity is guaranteed using the technique of on-path onion encryption. For generating pseudonyms, Huang et
al. [10] proposes an anonymity scheme, called PACP. The proposed PACP scheme is effective and efficient compared with the
anonymity schemes presented in the papers [60], [4] in terms of latency. Sun et al. [15] proposes pseudonymous authentication
scheme for the conditional anonymity, which is preserved by three techniques, including, 1) pseudonymous authentication, 2)
anonymous authentication for certificate updating, and 3) certificate updating based on re-signature technology. The paper [16]
analysis the Quality of Privacy (QoP) with the proposal of two anonymity analytic models, including, 1) anonymity analysis on
pseudonym changing at a small social spot (such as the road intersection), and 2) anonymity analysis on pseudonym changing
at a large social spot (such as the free parking lot).
D. Traceability
Traceability is a very important property, where the trusted authority is able to trace a node that is misbehaving in the network.
As discussed in the anonymity sub section, we have both the conditional traceability on signature and the full traceability on
signature [61], [51]. To the best of our knowledge, there is no current work studying the traceability in MSN, but we suggest
the two works presented in the papers [47], [48], [49] for possible applicability on MSNs. Ni et al. [47] proposes a protocol,
called AMA, for carpooling systems. The AMA protocol supports anonymity and traceability based on the trace phase, which
consists in calculating the public key of the passenger (driver) after the carpooling trip. Sun et al. [48] proposes an architecture,
called SAT, for achieving the traceability based on the blind signature [62], [63]. The SAT architecture is an improvement of the
idea presented in [49]. Unlike the MSN networks, there are other recently proposed works that aim in preserving traceability
in VSNs [20], [31], [36]. Chim et al. [20], via non-repudiation property of messages, address the traceability based on the
real identity of a particular vehicle, where the trusted authority can retrieve the real identity. Lu et al. [31] proposes an idea
based on use self-generated pseudonyms instead of real-world IDs. Chim et al. [36] propose a scheme based the real identity
tracking and revocation phase for satisfied the traceability and revocability.
E. Interest privacy
Since the nodes in ad hoc social networks are formed based on a common interest, the privacy of these common interests
should be preserved. The interest privacy has been explored firstly in the paper [21]. The topics of common interest in the
paper [21] focuses on like-minded vehicles to chat. More precisely, Lu et al. in [21] proposes a protocol, called FLIP, which
is based on authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols [64]. Based on degree of interest verification, Rabieh et al. [26] uses
the attribute based encryption in order to preserve the interest privacy.
F. Backward privacy
Once the nodes in ad hoc social network have been revoked, they should reveal no information in the revocation period. There
is one recently proposed work in [15] that discusses the backward privacy in VSNs. Sun et al. [15] propose an authentication
scheme called PASS for preserving the backward privacy. The PASS scheme use the one-way hash function, which it is still
difficult for any entity to reduce the certificate revocation used by the revoked vehicle. Moreover, there are some works related
to the backward privacy models, such as the forward secrecy and the backward secrecy [25].
G. Content oriented privacy
As discussed in the papers [40], [35], the content oriented privacy is based on three properties, including 1) immutability,
2) transparency, and 3) accountability. Ferrag et al. [40] proposes a scheme called ECPDR, which is based on node certificate
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updating. Based an idea of certificate evolution, Ferrag et al. [17] proposes a scheme called SDPP. Ferrag et al. in [35]
proposes another scheme called EPSA. The EPSA scheme uses the short signatures technique and the public key encryption
with keyword search for ensuring content oriented privacy. There are also other works related to the content oriented privacy
models, such as the impersonator resistance [27], [17] and the trust evaluation [14], [30].
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF PRIVACY ATTACKS IN MSNS AND DEFENSE SCHEMES
Xindicates fully supported; x indicates not supported; 0 indicates partially supported.
Privacy-preserving schemes
Adversary model [37] [38] [40] [14] [17] [35] [19] [22] [27] [30] [33] [23] [32] [41]
Forgery attack X X x x x x x X x x X 0 x x
Attribute-trace attack x x 0 x 0 0 x X x x x x 0 0
Eavesdropping attack x x 0 x 0 0 x X x x x x 0 0
Collusion attack x x x x x x x X 0 x X 0 x x
Wormhole attack x x 0 x 0 X 0 0 x x x x 0 0
Black hole attack x x X x X 0 x 0 x x x x 0 x
Sybil attack x x x X x x x x x x x x x x
Chosen-plaintext attack x x x x x x 0 0 X x 0 0 x 0
Spam attack x x x x x x x x x X x x x x
Identity theft attack 0 0 x x x x x 0 x x X 0 x x
User manipulation attack x x x x x x X 0 0 x 0 0 x x
Message tampering attack x X 0 x 0 0 x 0 x x x x 0 x
Routing attack x x X x X 0 x 0 x x x x 0 x
Linkability attack x x 0 X 0 0 x 0 x x x x 0 x
Rejection attack x x 0 X 0 0 x 0 x x x x 0 x
Modification attack x x 0 X 0 0 x 0 x x x x 0 x
Inside curious attack x x x x x x 0 0 0 x 0 X x 0
Outside forgery attack 0 0 x x x x x 0 x x 0 X x x
Demographic inference at-
tack
x x 0 x 0 0 x 0 x x x x X x
User-profiling attack x x x x x x x 0 x x x 0 x X
III. ATTACKS OF LEAKING PRIVACY
In this section, we discuss the attacks of leaking privacy in Ad Hoc Social Networks. The classification of attacks in ad
hoc networks frequently mentioned in literature is done using different criteria such as passive or active, internal or external
[65], [66], [67], [68] etc. In our survey articvle we classify the attacks of leaking privacy in five categories as shown in Fig.
3, including, 1) identity-based attack, 2) location-based attack, 3) eavesdropping-based attack, 4) manipulation-based attack,
and 5) service-based attack. In addition, Tab. IV and Tab. V give a detailed summary of security threats in MSNs and VSNs,
respectively.
A. Identity-based attack
The attacks that belong to this category are somehow related to the manipulation of the identity of legitimate users. As
identity based attacks we can characterize the Sybil attack and the Impersonation attack.
• Sybil attack: When an adversary node has multiple identities, a Sybil attack can be launched in the ad hoc social network.
The major goal of the adversary in this attack is to be a destination repeatedly. Once the packets are routed to him, then
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TABLE V
SUMMARY OF PRIVACY ATTACKS IN VSNS AND DEFENSE SCHEMES
Xindicates fully supported; x indicates not supported; 0 indicates partially supported.
Privacy-preserving schemes
Adversary model [25] [28] [12] [20] [31] [34] [11] [36] [39] [10] [15] [13] [16] [18] [21] [24] [9] [29]
Sybil attack X x X x X 0 x 0 x 0 x 0 x x x x 0 0
Global external attack x X x x 0 x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 0
Replaying attack x x X X x X x X x X X x x x x x X X
Impersonation attack x x 0 x 0 X x X x X x X x x x x X X
Location tracking attack x 0 x x X x 0 x x x x x x x x x x 0
Identity revealing attack 0 x 0 x X 0 x 0 x 0 x 0 x x x x 0 0
Eavesdropping attack x x x x x x X x x X x x X 0 0 0 X 0
Forgery attack x 0 x x 0 x X x x x x x x x x x x 0
Chosen plaintext attack x x x x x x x x X x x x x x x x x 0
Chosen ciphertext attack x x x x x x x x X x x x x x x x x 0
Adaptive chosen cipher-
text attack
x x x x x x x x X x x x x x x x x 0
Man-in-the-middle
attack
x x x x x x x x X x x x x x x x x 0
Denial-of-service (DoS)
attack
x x 0 0 x 0 x 0 x 0 X x x x x x 0 0
Source bogus attack x x 0 0 x 0 x 0 x 0 0 X x x x x 0 0
Black/grey hole attack x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x X 0 X 0 X 0 x
Successive-response
attack
x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x 0 0 X 0 0 x
Packet analysis attack x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x 0 0 0 X 0 x
Packet tracing attack x x x x x x 0 x x 0 x x 0 0 0 X 0 x
Brute force cryptanalytic
attack
x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x X
Incorrect data attack x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x X
Liability attack x x x x x x x x 0 x x x x x x x x X
he can realize other types of attacks such as the selective forwarding attack [69]. The TSE system [14] can resist the sybil
attacks using the idea of multiple reviews in a short time period. The scheme in [12] can post detected the Sybil attacks
by multiple valid pseudo-IDs. The framework in [31] can detect the Sybil attacks using the ID-based signature and the
ID-based online/offline signature.
• Impersonation attack: During the registration phase, when the vehicle with real identity generates its pseudo identity,
an impersonation adversary records this pseudo identity, which he can realize other types of attacks such as the identity
revealing attack [31] and the identity theft attack [33]. The protocol in [34], the PACP protocol in [10], and the SECSPP
scheme in [9] use authentication of messages to guard against impersonation attacks. The SPECS schemes in [36] uses a
phase called real identity tracking and revocation against an impersonation adversary. Since the single-attribute encryption
is employed in the STAP protocol [13], an impersonation adversary can be detected. With the use the safety message and
include a valid certificate from the trusted register authority, the MixGroup scheme in [29] can avoid the impersonation
attacks.
B. Location-based attack
This category of attacks is based on revealing the user location, and it consists of two major attacks the forgery attack and
the global external attack.
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Fig. 3. Classification of attacks of leaking privacy in Ad Hoc Social Networks
• Forgery attack: In this attack, a forgery adversary generates a misleading message with the bogus location information
in order to start the plotting attacks as the location tracking attack [31]. Using an explicit comparison-based approach, the
PPM protocol in [37] has been proven with a theorem (non-forgeability) that any profile forgery attack can be detected.
The SFPM protocol in [38] can resist to forgery attacks using a data processing center. The HealthShare scheme in [22]
can be effectively resisted to the forgery attacks using the attribute-oriented authentication scheme. The PEC scheme in
[33] can withstand to the forgery attacks via the group signature, which helps the trusted authority to track the user’s
unique identity. The PPBMA scheme in [11] can prevent the forgery attacks based on the verification of this equation,
MACkij (M
F
j ||TFj ) =?MACFij+1(MFj ||TFj ).
• Global external attack: This attack is proposed in the paper [28], which can be classified in this category, i.e., location-
based attack. More precisely, a global external adversary tracks a vehicle in terms of Time, Location, and Velocity. The
PCS strategy in [28] can resist to the global external attacks using two phases, including, 1) pseudonym self-delegated
generation, and 2) conditional tracking.
C. Eavesdropping-based attack
This category of attacks is based on eavesdropping the network communications, and it consists of four major attacks; 1)
eavesdropping attack, 2) packet analysis attack, 3) packet tracing attack, and 4) hole attack.
• Eavesdropping attack: When the nodes in ad hoc social network try to exchange the information on common interests, an
eavesdropping attack tries to attain the transmitted data without the certificates. Then, it can perform some operations on this
data using the linkability attack, rejection attack, and modification attack [38]. The HealthShare scheme in [22] is resistant
to the eavesdropping attacks based on the ciphertext generated by delegated encryption algorithm. The PPBMA scheme in
[11] is resistant against the eavesdropping attacks using the following condition: MACkij (Mj ||Tj) 6= MACki′j (Mj ||Tj).
Based on semantic security, the PACP protocol in [10] has been proved that is semantically secure against the eavesdropping
attacks. The SECSPP scheme in [9] has been proved that is secured against the eavesdropping attacks based on the
authorization access phase.
• Packet analysis attack: This is a type of attack that is popular in wired networks, where an adversary captures the
packets, and then it analyses in order to extract important information such as the common interests. In ad hoc social
networks, this attack has the same strategic but the probability of launch is high compared to wired networks [24]. In
addition, the successive-response attack [21] and the message tampering attack [38] could be run through the packet
analysis attack. However, the SPRING protocol in [24] can resist to the packet analysis attacks using the anonymous
authentication, which is based on a conditional privacy-preserving authentication technique. This technique is based on
two key phases, including, 1) privacy-preserving authentication, and 2) conditional tracking.
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• Packet tracing attack: After eavesdropping the source and destination locations of packet, an adversary can trace this
packet without need to recover the packet content [24]. In addition, when a security scheme uses the attributes, an attack
can be launched, called the attribute-trace attack [22]. Therefore, the routing attack [40], [17] and demographic inference
attack [32] could be run by tracing the packet controls used by the routing protocol. The SPRING protocol in [24] can
resist to the packet tracing attacks based on the anonymous authentication.
Fig. 4. Wormhole attack
Fig. 5. Replay attack
TABLE VI
APPROACHES FOR DETECTING AND AVOIDING THE HOLE ATTACKS
Scheme Type Data attacked Approach
SPRING [24]
(2010)
Black/grey hole Sensitive data Conditional authentication
technique
SDPP [17]
(2014)
Black hole Proactive Routing
data
Cooperative neighbor X
neighbor
STAP [13]
(2011)
Black/grey hole Sensitive data Signature algorithm
ECPDR [40]
(2013)
Wormhole attack User data Proxy re-signature cryp-
tography
SPF [18]
(2010)
Black/grey hole Sensitive data Anonymous identity-based
encryption
EPSA [35]
(2016)
Wormhole attack Reactive Routing
data
Cooperative neighbor X
neighbor
• Hole attack: This category consists of three types of attacks, including, wormhole attack, black hole attack, and grey hole
attack. The hole attack is based on creating a communication tunnel where an adversary eavesdrops the communication
inside the ad hoc social network through this tunnel, as shown in Fig. 4. Note that several adversaries can initiate the
creation of the tunnel, where the routing protocol will be totally under the control of these adversaries. Tab VI. shows
the approaches for detecting and avoiding the hole attacks in ad hoc social networks. For detecting blackhole attacks, the
SDPP scheme proposed in [17] usse the cooperative neighbor technique and the homomorphic encryption method. The
ECPDR scheme in [40] can resist to a wormhole attack using a restore strategy with the proxy re-signature cryptography
technology. The EPSA scheme in [35] can detect and prevent a wormhole attack by using the cooperative neighbor X
neighbor, its performance depending on the length of the tunnel created from the adversaries, i.e., the longer the tunnel,
the higher the detection rate. Tracking the inside black/grey hole adversaries is possible with the STAP protocol which
is presented in [13] with the use of the validity of sig(CTL), where sig is a signature algorithm and CTL is the
timestamp/location information. The SPF protocol [18] can resist to black/grey hole attacks using the anonymous identity-
based encryption. The SPRING protocol [24] can also track inside black/grey hole adversaries by using the conditional
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TABLE VII
APPROACHES FOR DETECTING AND AVOIDING THE REPLAY ATTACKS
Reference Data attacked Approach
Lu et al. [12]
(2010)
Inner data stored in the OBU Checks |T ′ − T | ≤
∆T
Chim et al. [20]
(2014)
Local data of RSU Timestamps
Xiong et al. [34]
(2012)
Data of member manager Timestamps
Chim et al. [36]
(2011)
Data broadcast by the RSU Timestamps
Huang et al. [10]
(2011)
All data in the network Timestamps
Sun et al. [15]
(2010)
Data broadcast by the vehicles Timestamps
Li et al. [9]
(2008)
Data transmitted between the vehicles Sequence numbers
Yu et al. [29]
(2016)
Data broadcast by the vehicles Timestamps
privacy-preserving authentication technique. In addition, the SPRING protocol can detect black/grey hole attacks with a
detection algorithm, which is based on the distance d(Xi) of each node Xi in all vehicle nodes V to the mean X and
the thresholds TB , TG for black hole attack and grey hole attack, where d(Xi) = |Xi − X|, X = 1|V |
∑|V |
i=1Xi. The
node is considered as a grey/black hole adversary when d (Xi) > TG or d (Xi) > TB .
D. Manipulation-based attack
This category of attacks is based on the manipulation of nodes of the Ad Hoc Social Network (users or socialspots), and it
consists of two major attacks; 1) user manipulation attack and 2) man-in-the-middle attack.
• User manipulation attack: In this attack, an adversary tries to appear as a hotspot (small or large) for the nodes in ad hoc
social network, in order to have the updates certificates. For example, an adversary sends a packet containing information
of a false hotspot, then the node run the update certificates phase with this adversary. Therefore, these nodes have to
honestly tell about their hotspots [19]. In addition, the brute force cryptanalytic attack, incorrect data attack, and liability
attack [29], could be run through the user manipulation attack. The protocol proposed in [19] uses the authentication
against the user manipulation attack. Specifically, this protocol is based on a privacy-preserving routing tree in order to
make sensitive hotspots anonymous.
• Man-in-the-middle attack: The idea of this attack is like the idea in the hole attacks, but we classify it in this category
because the adversary manipulates the users. The man-in-the-middle attack is especially applicable in the Diffie–Hellman
key exchange method. As discussed in the survey [70], man-in-the-middle attack aims to compromise confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. However, in order to reduce the security of the encryption scheme, the adversary can launch
other types of attacks in this category as the chosen plaintext attack, chosen ciphertext attack, inside curious attack, and
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack [39]. In addition, an adversary can launch a collusion attack [22], [33] where he tries
to find two different packets p1 and p2 such that hash(p1) = hash(p2). The EP2DF scheme in [39] proposed a
novel authentication framework, called lite-CA-based public key cryptosystem, to thwart the man-in-the-middle attacks
and has been proved that is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. Recall that the schemes resist against the
eavesdropping attacks can resist against the collusion attacks. Based on the independent relation of the secret shares, the
PEC scheme in [33] can avoid the collusion attacks.
E. Service-based attack
This category of attacks aiming to make a service unavailable of the network and it consists of four major attacks; 1)
replaying attack, 2) denial-of-service (DoS) attack, 3) source bogus attack, and 4) spam attack.
• Replaying attack: When a node A wants to exchange data with node B, the node A must prove its identity, which the
node B request a valid certificate, i.e., authentication information as shown in Fig. 5. Then, the node A sent this certificate
in a signed packet (SP). During this exchange, an adversary listening and saves this signed packet. Once the exchange
is completed, this adversary tries to contact the node B. Hence, the node B request a valid certificate to adversary. The
adversary sent the SP to the node B. At the end, the node B believes be dealing with the node A, and a service can
be unavailable by the adversary. Note that this attack was discussed in several papers [12], [20], [34], [36], [10], [15],
[9], [29]. Tab VII. shows the approaches for detecting and avoiding the replay attacks in ad hoc social networks. After
the verification of the identity PIDi, by a valid time interval ∆T for transmission delay, the intelligent parking scheme
in [12] can avoid the replaying attacks when the RSU checks the following condition : |T ′ − T | ≤ ∆T . Similarly to
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the scheme in [12], the scheme in [20], the scheme in [34], the PASS scheme in [15], and the SECSPP scheme in [9]
checks the timestamps in the messages to reduce the impact of replay attack. When the RSU stores the pseudo-identities
used by vehicles, the SPECS scheme in [36] can avoid the replay attacks with the help of RSU, which he can checks
the pseudo-identity in its database. The PACP protocol in [10] can avoid the replay attacks with the use of authentication
and sequence numbers. The MixGroup scheme in [29] can avoid the replay attacks with the use of timestamps in the
revocation operation.
• Denial-of-service (DoS) attack: This attack is the heart of this category. During the social communications, an adversary
can launch a DoS attack in order to put a service unavailable, for example, disruption of routing process, block a file
server, wasting the limited buffer resource, or preventing the distribution of secret keys. Therefore, DoS attack can be
launched from several layers, i.e., link layer, physical layer, network layer, transport layers, and application layers [65].
To detect the Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, the PASS scheme in [15] adopt the Schnorr signature algorithm and the
prestore strategy to signing certificate CertTA,Vi,k and pseudonymous certificate CertTA,Vi,j .
• Source bogus attack: This attack is qualified as an inside attack, which a source deliberately inject bogus data in the
social communications to wasting the limited buffer resource of the nodes [13]. In addition, this attack is similar to the
incorrect data attack [29] but with other objectives. Note that we found only Lin et al. [13] that discuss the source bogus
attack in the ad hoc social networks until now. The STAP protocol in [13] uses the single-attribute encryption against the
source bogus attacks.
• Spam attack: This attack is very popular in electronic mails. In general, an adversary tries to send several e-mails to
multiple receivers whose addresses have generally been recovered on the internet. The first goal of this attack is to do
advertising at lower prices. However, an adversary can launch this attack in ad hoc social networks in order firstly to
disrupt the data filtering and secondly to spy the storage space. Note that we found only Hameed et al. [30] that discuss
the spam attack in the ad hoc social networks until now. The LENS system in [30] can prevent the spam transmission
using the idea of Gate keepers.
TABLE VIII
CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS USED IN PRIVACY-PRESERVING SCHEMES FOR MSNS
Xindicates that the scheme uses the cryptographic method.
Privacy-preserving schemes
Cryptographic methods [37] [38] [40] [14] [17] [35] [19] [22] [27] [33] [23] [41]
Secure cryptographic hash functions [71] X X X X X X X X X
Homomorphic encryption [72] X X X
Multiple pseudonym technique [73] X
HMAC [74] X
Short signatures technique [75] X X
Identity-Based Aggregate Signatures [76] X
Identity-based encryption [77] X
PKE with keyword search [78] [79] X
Linear Secret Sharing [80] X X
Attribute-based encryption [81] X
Hidden vector encryption [82][83] X
Short group signature [51] X
IV. COUNTERMEASURES AND GAME THEORETIC APPROACHES
Most privacy preserving schemes for ad hoc social networks that we have examined use the cryptography as a countermeasure
in order to preserve privacy. Generally, cryptography is one of the disciplines of cryptology, which was initialy proposed in order
to protect data, i.e., ensuring confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity using secrets or keys. Fig. 6 presents the taxonomy
of cryptographic primitives [94]. The cryptographic methods used in privacy-preserving schemes for MSNs and VSNs are
summarized in Tab. VIII and Tab. IX, respectively. In order to prove these security schemes theoretically, researchers can use
game theoretic approaches [95], [96]. In this section, we will discuss the state of the art of privacy-preserving schemes for
VSNs and MSNs and we provide a description and types of game theoretic models for preserving privacy in ad hoc social
networks.
A. Symmetric-key primitives
Symmetric-key primitives can be classified on three types of techniques, including, symmetric key-ciphers, keyed hash
function, and pseudo-random sequences. In order to secure data at the MAC layer, AES block cipher algorithm was proposed
in the IEEE 802.15.4 [97]. Yang et al. [38] used keyed-hashing for message authentication code (HMAC) [74] in order to
achieve the integrity of the message and source data authentication. To compute HMAC, the scheme [38] chooses a secret
key for users Kj(|Kj | = 128) for Uj ∈ U and KA(|KA| = 128) for UA, then it sends (s,Kj) and (d,KA) to Uj and UA,
respectively, where s, d ∈ Zp.
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TABLE IX
CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS USED IN PRIVACY-PRESERVING SCHEMES FOR VSNS
Xindicates that the scheme uses the cryptographic method.
Privacy-preserving schemes
Cryptographic methods [25] [28] [12] [20] [31] [34] [11] [36] [39] [10] [15] [13] [18] [21] [24] [9] [29]
Secure cryptographic hash functions [71] X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Verifier-local revocation [84] X X
Short signatures technique [75] X X X X X
Ephemeral key [85] X
Identity-based encryption [77] X X
Proxy Re-encryption [86] X
ID-based signature [87] X
ID-based online/offline signature [88] X
Ring signature [59] X
Certificateless public key [89][90] X
Schnorr signature algorithm [91] X
Elliptic curve (ECDSA) [92] v
CPPA Technique [60] X
Blind signature [62][63] X
Non-interactive ID-based PKC [93] X
Multiple pseudonym technique [73] X
Fig. 6. Taxonomy of cryptographic primitives
B. Public-key primitives
Public-key primitives can be classified on two types of techniques, including, public-key encryptions and signatures. We
note that the public-key primitives is used mostly by privacy-preserving schemes.
Public-key encryption is potentially a good security solution when the number of nodes is very high. The schemes [17],
[12], [10] use the identity-based encryption [77]. When an OBU with identifier IDi registers itself to the system, the proposed
scheme uses the secret key s to encrypt the real identifier IDi into a pseudo-ID PIDi = Encss (IDi|| ri), where ri is
randomly chosen from Z∗q . Then, the OBU encrypts the message M based on pseudo-ID PIDi , the current timestamp T , and
the ephemeral key. The scheme [35] uses the public key encryption with keyword search [78], [79], which is takes as input
the public key PK and keywords (w1, w2, · · · , wl) that is associated with one document in order to output a ciphertext C.
Then, it uses the trapdoor information Tw′1,w′2,··· ,w′l and Test(C, Tw′1,w′2,··· ,w′l).
Based on user attributes, Liang et al. [33] adopted the attribute-based encryption [81], which outputs a ciphertext associated
with the attribute set. Following a different approach and focusing on achieving efficient fine-grained filtering, Zhang et al.
[23] used the hidden vector encryption [82], [83]. Specifically, the filter creator in the scheme [23] generates his fine-grained
keyword filter as a vector w = (w1, · · · , wl) ∈ {1, · · · , n}l.
Dong et al. [39] proposed the certificate less public key (CL-PKC) [89], [90] in order to achieve lightweight public key
certificate management. The CL-PKC is specified by the following seven randomized algorithms: Setup, Partial-Private-
Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key, Encrypt, and Decrypt. The Setup algorithm is run by the key
generating center (KGC), which outputs the system parameters params and master − key. The Partial-Private-Key-Extract
algorithm returns a partial private key DAusing params, master − key, and an identifier for entity A,IDA ∈ {0, 1}∗. The
Set-Secret-Value algorithm outputs A’s secret value xA using params and IDA. The Set-Private-Key algorithm outputs the
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(full) private key SA using IDA, and xA. The Set-Public-Key algorithm constructs the public key PA for entity A using
params and xA. The Encrypt algorithm outputs a ciphertext C using PA and IDA. The Decrypt algorithm returns a message
M using params, C, and SA. Chim et al. [20] proposed a proxy re-encryption [86] that is based on the following algorithm:
TABLE X
GAME THEORETIC APPROACHES USED IN PRIVACY-PRESERVING SCHEMES
Scheme Approach Main results
ECPDR scheme [40]
(2013)
Static game Protect location privacy
Scheme [19]
(2012)
Cooperation game Determine the optimal data forward-
ing strategy
SSH scheme [27]
(2011)
Sequence games Prove that IBE is IND-sPS-CPA se-
cure under the k-SPDBDH assump-
tion in the random oracle model
PCS strategy [28]
(2012)
Noncooperative informa-
tion static game
Prove that the feasibility of the
pseudonym changing at social spots
(PCS) strategy
SPECS scheme [36]
(2011)
Static game Protect message integrity and authen-
tication
FLIP protocol [21]
(2010)
Sequence games Demonstrate that the protocol is se-
cure in the VANET scenarios
The scheme [84]
(2004)
Traceability game Prove that the group signature scheme
satisfies the requirements traceability
Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, RKGen, Reencrypt. The Setup algorithm is used in order to output both the master public
parameters and the master secret key. The KeyGen algorithm outputs a decryption key skid corresponding to identity id.
The Encrypt algorithm outputs cid, the encryption of message under the specified identity. The Decryp talgorithm decrypts
the ciphertext cid using the secret key skid. The RKGen algorithm produces a re-encryption key rkid1→id2 . The Reencrypt
algorithm outputs a “re-encrypted” ciphertext cid2 .
Li et al. [9] presented the non-interactive ID-based public-key cryptography [93], which is based on three following phases,
namely: system setup, user registration, and authentication, respectively. The system setup phase outputs the public key e
in Z∗∅(N) and a corresponding private key d where e ∗ d ≡ 1(mod∅ (N)). The user registration phase outputs a secret key
si = e ∗ logg(ID2i )(mod∅ (N)) for the node Ui. The authentication phase verifies Y = (ID2i )
r∗sj
= (ID2i )
r∗sj
(mod∅ (N)).
Homomorphic encryption [72] is used by three schemes [37], [17] [41]. Rothblum in [98] considers homomorphic encryption
as a public-key scheme. Specifically, homomorphic encryption uses the public key (N, g) and the corresponding private key
sk(λ, δ) in order to construct both the ciphertext c and the plaintext m. The ciphertext c = gm ·rnmod N where r is a random
number. The plaintext m = L
(
cλmodN
2
)
· δ mod N , where (x) = (x − 1)/N . The additive homomorphic property is as
follows: (m1) · E (m2) = (gm1 · r1n) (gm2 · r2n)mod N2 = E(m1 +m2).
To achieve anonymous authentication, the schemes in [28], [20], [36], [10], [29] [40], [35] use the Boneh–Boyen short
signature [75]. In general, the following three algorithms specify a signature scheme: KeyGen, Sign, and Verify. The KeyGen
algorithm outputs a random key pair (PK,SK) . The Sign algorithm constructs a signature σ using a private key SK and a
message M . The Verify algorithm verifies the signature and returns valid or invalid. The Boneh–Boyen short signature [75] is
based on these three algorithms: Key Generation, Signing, and Verification. The Key Generation algorithm is same as KeyGen.
The Signing algorithm outpust the signature (b, Sign(m)) where σ = H1 (SK,M) ∈ {0, 1} , m = H2(b,M) , H1 and H2
two hash functions. The Verification algorithm outputs valid if V erify (PK,H2 (b,M) , σ) = valid. Note that there is the
ID-based signature [87] and the ID-based online/offline signature [88] which are used by the scheme in [31].
Liang et al. in [33] proposes a short group signature [51] that is based on the following algorithm: Setup, Join, Sign, Verify,
and Trace, which could be executed by three parties: group manager, user, and verifier. The Setup algorithm outputs the public
parameters PP , the master key MK, and the tracing key TK, where PP = (g, h, Z) ∈ G × Gq × Gp, MK = z ∈ Z∗n,
TK = q ∈ Z. n = pq where p, q are random primes and G is a cyclic bilinear group and its subgroup Gp and Gq of respective
order p and q. g is a generator of G and h is a generator of Gq . The Join algorithm construct the secret key Kid = (sid, g
1
z+sid )
, where sid is a user’s identity id. The Sign algorithm outputs signature σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, pi1, pi2) ∈ G5. The Verify algorithm
verifies T1 =?e(h, pi1) and T2 =?e(h, pi2). The Trace algorithm trace the identity of signer using PP , TK, and σ. Moreover,
note that group signatures with verifier-local revocation [84] are used in both the scheme in [25] and the scheme in [29]. In
addition, a blind signature [62], [63] is used in the scheme [9], a schnorr signature algorithm [91] is used in the scheme [15],
and a ring signature [59] is used in the scheme [34].
C. Unkeyed primitives
Unkeyed primitives can be classified on two types of techniques, including, hash functions and random sequences. The secure
cryptographic hash functions [71] are used in most privacy-preserving schemes for MSNs and VSNs, where the cryptographic
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hash function is used in order to check the integrity of a message. For example, modifying a message when transmitting can be
proved by comparing the message hash value before and after transmission. Specifically, using a security parameter λ, a hashing
function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ is cryptographically secure if it satisfies three security properties, namely, pre-image-resistance,
second pre-image resistance, and collision-resistance.
D. Game theoretic approaches
To prove the feasibility of privacy-preserving schemes in practice, researchers in the security field use various mathematical
tools such as game theoretic approaches [95]. Since the efficiency of cryptographic methods has already been proved, we note
that only a small fraction of privacy-preserving schemes that we have examined, used game theoretic approaches, which are
summarized in Tab. X. More precisely, Ferrag et al. in [40] use the static game [99] in the ECPDR scheme to protect location
privacy. Liang et al. in [19] uses the cooperation game to determine the optimal data forwarding strategy. The SSH scheme
[27] uses the sequence games to prove that IBE is IND-sPS-CPA is secure under the k-SPDBDH assumption in the random
oracle model. The pseudonym changing at social spots (PCS) strategy [28] uses non-cooperative information static game [99]
to prove the feasibility of PCS. Similarly to the scheme [40], Chim et al. in [36] use the static game to protect message
integrity and authentication. The sequence games is used by the FLIP protocol [21] to demonstrate that the protocol is secure
in the VANET scenarios. Finally, the scheme [84] use the traceability game to prove that the group signature scheme satisfies
the requirements traceability. For more details, we refer the reader to the survey [95].
TABLE XI. Summary of privacy-preserving schemes for MSNs (Published between 2011 and 2016)
Scheme Network
model
Privacy model Goals Main phases Performances (+) and lim-
itations (-)
Liang
et al.
[37]
(2013)
Each user has a
profile with di-
mension vector
to find the tar-
geting user
Non-anonymity;
Conditional
anonymity;
Full Anonymity
Users compare their
profiles while not
disclosing the pro-
files
Explicit comparison-based
approach;
Implicit comparison-based
approach;
Implicit predicate-based ap-
proach
+ Anonymity break period
+ Anonymity risk level
-Limited analysison the
impact of “=” on the
anonymity
Yang et
al. [38]
(2016)
Specified by
a trusted key
distribution
center with a
semi-trusted
data processing
center
Privacy
preservation the
profiles of users
Minimize the per-
sonal profiles dis-
closure
Cosine similarity matching;
Weighted l1-norm matching
+ Computation complexity
+ Average running time vs.
number of profile items
-The layer routing is not
considered
Ferrag
et al.
[40]
(2013)
Each user has
a sociality
strength in a
set of social
hotspots
Immutability;
Transparency;
Accountability;
Improve routing
by privacy
preservation
Node certificate updating;
Message signature and ver-
ification;
Response Requested;
Demand Response
+ Black hole detection rate
+ Transmission delay
-Limited analysis with few
adversaries
Liang
et al.
[14]
(2014)
Multiple
vendors
offering similar
services to
users where
each vendor
is equipped
with a wireless
communication
device
Trust evaluation Detect and prevent
the sybil attacks
Structured reviews;
Synchronization tokens;
Review generation and sub-
mission
+ Provides a good security
analysis of sybil attacks
- No comparison with other
systems
Ferrag
et al.
[17]
(2014)
Peer-to-
peer node
community
with a large
number of
mobile users
Transparency;
Impersonator resis-
tance
Provides the
strong privacy-
preservation of
message;
Provides the
evolution of users’
certificates
Detecting attacks;
Response Requested;
Demand Response;
Certificate evolution
+ Detectreq reporting delay
+ Transmission delay
- Need of large Detectreq
reporting
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Ferrag
et al.
[35]
(2016)
Each user has
a sociality
strength
Immutability;
Transparency;
Accountability
Detect and prevent
the wormhole at-
tacks
Peer registration phase;
Document forwarding
phase;
Detection, verification and
avoidance
+ Hole link detection accu-
racy
+ Transmission delay
-Many assumptions needed
to understand implementa-
tion
Liang
et al.
[19]
(2012)
Each user has
a sociality
strength and a
morality state
in a set of
social hotspots
Location privacy;
Identity privacy
Privacy
preservation and
cooperative data
forwarding
Privacy-preserving route-
based authentication;
Proximity measurement;
Morality-driven data
forwarding
+ Sociality strength
+ Cooperation effect
+ Delivery ratio in games
- Diverse behavior models
is not considered
Liang
et al.
[22]
(2012)
Patients
and doctors
communicate
through
health social
networks;
Each user has
a social-active
factor
Privacy of informa-
tion shared
Attribute-oriented
authentication;
Attribute-oriented
transmission
Attribute initialization;
Attribute-oriented authenti-
cation;
Attribute-oriented transmis-
sion
+ Impact of social-active
factor
+ Attribute-oriented trans-
mission
-No comparison with other
methods
Lu et
al. [27]
(2011)
Patients
and doctors
communicate
through mobile
health social
networks
Identity privacy;
Impersonator resis-
tance
Provides a secure
same-symptom-
based handshake
System setup algorithm;
Patient joining algorithm;
Patients same-symptom-
based handshaking
algorithm
+ Average delivery ratio
+ Average reporting delay
-No comparison with other
methods
Hameed
et al.
[30]
(2011)
Each user has
a sociality with
his e-mail
Trust evaluation Prevention of Spam
transmission
Community formation;
Trust management;
Gate Keeper selection;
Spam report handler
+ Performance of email fil-
tration
-Limited analysis, no com-
parison with prevent spam
transmission schemes avail-
able.
Liang
et al.
[33]
(2011)
Patients
and doctors
communicate
through health
social networks
Identity privacy;
Privacy of informa-
tion shared
Enhancing
availability;
Ensuring
unlinkability of
the transactions
Registration;
Emergency call generation;
Emergency call verification
+ Decryption efficiency
+ Revocation efficiency
-No consideration the de-
centralized emergency re-
sponse system
Zhang
et al.
[23]
(2015)
Each mobile
user has a
sociality in ad
hoc network
with local
stores.
Identity privacy Develop a person-
alized fine-grained
filtering
Social-assisted filter distri-
bution;
Coarse-grained and fine-
grained filters;
Merkle Hash tree-based fil-
ter authentication and up-
date
+ Can efficiently update the
distributed filters
-Many assumptions needed
to understand implementa-
tion
Li et al.
[32]
(2016)
Each mobile
user has
a sociality
with the
sensitive data or
demographics
of the target.
Privacy of location
sharing
Provide different
privacy controls
Maximum common trace
based inference approach;
Machine learning based in-
ference approach
+ Comparison of shared
mobility and ground truth
traces
- No comparison with other
frameworks
Luo et
al. [41]
(2016)
Each user has a
personal profile
in the course of
friendship dis-
covery
User privacy
preservation
Ensures high level
privacy of user pro-
file information
One-hop friend discovery
matching;
Multi-hop friend discovery
matching
+ Communication overhead
+ Comparison with other
methods
- No consideration the iden-
tity privacy and location
privacy
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V. PRIVACY-PRESERVING SCHEMES FOR MSNS
In this section, we in-detail examine fourteen privacy-preserving schemes developed for or applied in the context of MSNs.
Based on the network model, we classify these schemes in six categories, including, social profile, social morality, social
routing, social health, location-based services, and service-oriented sociality. In addition, these schemes as shown in Tab. XI
are published between 2011 and 2016.
A. Network model with social profile
In [37], Liang et al. considers that each user has a profile represented by a distinct dimension vector that can be used to
find the targeting user. Specifically, the work in [37] presents a scheme, called PPM, which can preserve three privacy models,
including, 1) non-anonymity, 2) conditional anonymity, and 3) full anonymity. With the PPM scheme, users can compare their
profiles while not disclosing the profiles. The PPA uses three main phases, namely, explicit comparison, implicit comparison,
and implicit predicate. The PPM scheme is efficient in terms of anonymity break period and anonymity risk level, but the
article fails to provide a detailed analysis on the impact of ”=” on the anonymity. Privacy preserving of the profiles of users
is an important topic as identified in [38]. Yang et al. in [38] characterized a MSN by a trusted key distribution center with
a semi-trusted data processing center and he proposed a privacy preserving protocol called SFPM. In order to minimize the
personal profiles disclosure, the SFPM protocol uses two main phases of matching, including, 1) cosine similarity and 2)
weighted l1-norm. The SFPM protocol is efficient in terms of computation complexity and average running time vs. number
of profile items, but the layer routing is not considered. In another recent work [41] Luo et al. proposes a privacy-preserving
multi-hop profile-matching protocol for proximity-based mobile social networks.
B. Network model with social morality
In [19], authors state that each user has a sociality strength and a morality state in a set of social hotspots. Specifically,
Liang et al. [19] developed a protocol for privacy preservation and cooperative data forwarding, which can protect both the
location privacy and the identity privacy of the user. This protocol uses three main phases, including, 1) privacy-preserving
route-based authentication, 2) proximity measurement, and 3) morality-driven data forwarding. In addition, this protocol is
efficient in terms of sociality strength, cooperation effect, and delivery ratio in games, but diverse behavior models are not
considered.
C. Network model with social routing
The routing protocol in social ad hoc networks is a principal element to efficiently route the produced social data. The
works in [40], [17], [35] consider the sociality in routing protocols as the OLSR protocol [100] and the AODV protocol
[101]. Ferrag et al. in [40] developed a scheme, called ECPDR, in order to improve routing by incorporating the privacy
preservation dimension. The ECPDR scheme can provide immutability, transparency, and accountability. For detecting attacks,
the ECPDR scheme uses four main phases, including,1) node certificate updating, 2) message signature and verification, 3)
response requested, and 4) demand response. In addition, the ECPDR scheme is efficient in terms of black hole detection rate
and transmission delay, but gives a limited analysis with few adversaries. Ferrag et al. [17] considering a peer-to-peer node
community with a large number of mobile users proposes a novel scheme, called SDPP. Based on the certificate evolution phase,
the SDPP scheme can provide transparency and impersonator resistance. The SDPP scheme is efficient in terms of reporting
delay and transmission delay, but leads to the creation of large reports. Ferrag et al. [35] focuses on detecting and preventing
the wormhole attacks and proposes a scheme called EPSA. The EPSA scheme is based on three main phases, including, 1)
peer registration, 2) document forwarding, and 3) detection, verification and avoidance. The ESPA scheme is efficient in terms
of hole link detection accuracy and transmission delay, but makes too many assumptions regarding the network characteristics.
D. Network model with social health
The health social networks (HSNs) which are essential for the communication between patients and doctors demand highly
efficient privacy-preserving schemes. In [22], Liang et al. considers that each user has a social-active factor in HSN. The
HealthShare scheme in [22] is proposed in order to provides privacy of information shared, which is devided in three main
phases including, 1) attribute initialization, 2) attribute-oriented authentication, and 3) attribute-oriented transmission. The
HealthShare scheme is efficient in terms of the impact of social-active factor and the attribute-oriented transmission, but the
article doesn’t present a comparison of the proposed mechainsm with other methods. In [33], Liang et al. developed a scheme,
called PEC, for HSN. The PEC scheme ensures unlinkability of the transactions and it is based on two main algorithms; 1)
emergency call generation and 2) emergency call verification.The PEC scheme is efficient in decryption and revocation, but
needs the consideration of the decentralized emergency response system. Similarly to [22] and [33], in [27], Lu et al. proposed a
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scheme, called SSH, which targets mobile users in HSNs. The SSH scheme provides a secure same-symptom-based handshake
based on two main phases, including,1) patient joining and 2) patients same-symptom-based handshaking. In addition, the SSH
scheme is efficient in delivery ratio and reporting delay, but authors dont present a thorough comparison of their system with
othersimilar methods.
E. Network model with location-based services
The geosocial networking is a new concept in the topic of social networking, where each mobile user has a sociality whcih
is associated with some sensitive data or the demographics of the target. In [32], an interesting recent work considers the
demographics (e.g., age, gender, education) in MSN, and based on these the authors proposed a new set of attacks that can
infer the demographics. Specifically, in order to provide full privacy of location sharing, one needs to combine the following
approaches in [32]: 1) maximum common trace based inference approach and 2) machine learning based inference approach.
The work in [32] presents a good comparison of shared mobility and ground truth traces. In addition, the work in [32] developed
a framework, called SmartMask, for the protection of location privacy, which needs to be compared with other frameworks in
the future in order to test its efficiency. The idea of social spot in MSN proposed in the VSLP protocol [102] can be applied
in this category.
F. Network model with service-oriented sociality
Liang et al. [14] developed a system, called TSE, which considers multiple vendors offering similar services to users where
each vendor is equipped with a wireless communication device. The TSE system provides a trust evaluation mechanism and can
detect and prevent a sybil attacks. The TSE system is based on three main phases, namely, structured reviews, synchronization
tokens, and review generation and submission. The work in [14] provides a good security analysis of the mechanism against
sybil attacks, but lacks comparison with other systems. Similarly to the TSE scheme [14], the LENS scheme [30] also provides
a trust evaluation and prevention mechanism against spam transmission. Zhang et al. [23] developed a personalized fine-grained
filtering scheme, called PIF. The PIF scheme considers that each mobile user has a sociality in an ad hoc network with local
stores. The PIF scheme is based on three main phases, namely, social-assisted filter distribution, coarse-grained and fine-
grained filters, and merkle hash tree-based filter authentication and update. In addition, the PIF scheme can efficiently update
the distributed filters but makes too many assumptions regarding the network characteristics.
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TABLE XII. Summary of privacy-preserving schemes for VSNs (Published between 2008 and 2016)
Scheme Network
model
Privacy model Goal Main phases Performances (+) and lim-
itations (-)
Lu et
al. [25]
(2012)
A typical
location based
services in
VANET
Forward secrecy ;
Backward secrecy ;
Collusion
resistance
Support a privacy-
preserving
authentication
in the vehicle-user-
joining phase ;
Enable vehicle
users to
autonomously
update the session
key
Location based services set-
tings ;
Vehicle user joining ;
Vehicle user departure
+Key update delay
+Key update ratio
-Compared only with the
traditional key update
Lu et
al. [28]
(2012)
VANET with
a collection of
social spots
Location privacy Facilitate vehicles
to achieve high-
level location
Key generation ;
Pseudonym self-delegated
generation ;
Conditional tracking
+Anonymity set size
+Location privacy gain
+ Feasibility is proved us-
ing game-theoretic tech-
niques
- Limited analysis with the
threat model
Lu et
al. [12]
(2010)
VANET with a
large number of
parking spaces
Conditional privacy
preservation
Develop an intel-
ligent parking for
large parking lots ;
Support a privacy-
preserving of the
drivers
Real-time parking naviga-
tion ;
Intelligent antitheft protec-
tion ;
Friendly parking informa-
tion dissemination
+Searching time delay
- No comparison with other
scheme in term of coverage
ratio
Chim
et al.
[20]
(2014)
VANET Identity privacy-
preserving
Traceability
Guide vehicles to
desired destinations
in a distributed
manner ;
Support a privacy-
preserving of the
drivers
Generation of anonymous
credentials ;
Activation and requesting
for master key ;
Requesting for anonymous
credential ;
Requesting for navigation
service ;
Navigation request and re-
ply propagation ;
Verification of RSUs’ hop
information ;
Guiding to destination
+Processing delay
+Reduction in travelling
time
+ Analysis on time com-
plexity
- Limited analysis with the
threat model
Huang
et al.
[31]
(2012)
VANET Identity privacy-
preserving ;
Traceability
Solving the issues
of authentication
and privacy in
VANET
V2R and R2V authentica-
tion ;
V2V authentication ;
Cross-RSU V2V authenti-
cation
+Storage requirement and
computation
- No threat model presented
Xiong
et al.
[34]
(2012)
VANET with
a member
manager
Multi-level
anonymity
Support a multi-
level conditional
privacy preserving
OBU safety message gener-
ation ;
Message verification ;
OBU fast tracing
+Storage requirements
+Computational overheads
- Limited analysis with the
threat model
Ying et
al. [11]
(2013)
VANET Anonymity Support a privacy
preserving of
broadcast message
Vehicle registration ;
Hash chain generation ;
Data transmission
+Average link layer delay
+Average data packet delay
- Location privacy is not
considered
Chim
et al.
[36]
(2011)
VANET Identity privacy
preserving ;
Traceability ;
Revocability
Satisfy the privacy
requirement based
only on two shared
secrets
Initial handshaking ;
Message signing ;
Batch verification ;
Real identity tracking and
revocation ;
Group key generation ;
Group message signing and
verification
+Data transmission
+Invalid batch successful
rate
- Location privacy is not
considered
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Dong et
al. [39]
(2011)
VANET with a
lite certificate
authority
Location privacy ;
Anonymity
Solving the issues
of authentication
and privacy in
VANET
Lite-CA-based public key
cryptosystem ;
Identity-based public key
cryptosystem
+Encryption cost compari-
son
+Computational cost com-
parison
- Limited consideration of
routing protocols.
Huang
et al.
[10]
(2011)
VANET Conditional privacy
preservation ;
Anonymity
Solving the issues
of authentication
and privacy in
VANET such as
low pseudonym
generation latency,
high scalability,
and easy revocation
Registration and genera-
tion ;
Extraction ;
Encryption and decryption ;
Revocation
+Protocol latency analysis
+Comparison of search
times for revocation
- Mobility models are not
considered
Sun et
al. [15]
(2010)
VANET Backward privacy ;
Conditional
anonymity ;
Nonrepudiation ;
Identity revocation
Solving the issues
of authentication
and privacy in
VANET
RSU certificate issuing ;
Vehicle pseudonymous cer-
tificate issuing ;
Vehicle pseudonymous cer-
tificate updating ;
Identity revocation ;
Message signature and ver-
ification.
+Revocation overhead
+Certificate updating over-
head
+Authentication overhead
+ Efficient compared to
other schemes
- Location privacy is not
considered
Lin et
al. [13]
(2011)
VANET with
a collection of
social spots
Location privacy ;
Vehicle
conditional privacy
preservation
Achieving receiver-
location privacy
preservation in
VANETs
Packet sending ;
Social-tier dissemination ;
Packet receiving
+Average delivery ratio
+Packet average delay
-No comparison with other
protocols
Lu et
al. [16]
(2011)
VANET with
a collection
of social spots
(including
small social
spot and large
social spot)
Location privacy ;
Anonymity
Achieving
the location
privacy based
on pseudonyms
changing technique
Pseudonym changing at
small social spot ;
Pseudonym changing at
large social spot
+Anonymity set size
-No comparison with other
methods
Lu et
al. [18]
(2010)
VANET with
a collection of
social spots
Receiver-location
privacy
Achieving the
location privacy
based “Sacrificing
the Plum Tree for
the Peach Tree”
tactic
Packet generation ;
Packet forwarding ;
Packet receiving
+Average packet delivery
ratio
+Average packet delay
-No comparison with other
protocols
Lu et
al. [21]
(2010)
VANET with
not include
RSUs
Identity privacy ;
Location privacy ;
Interest privacy
Facilitate vehicles
to communicate the
common interest ;
Protects the interest
privacy from other
vehicles who don’t
have the same
interest
Privacy preserving finding
like-minded vehicle on the
road
+Average delay for finding
the like-minded vehicle
- Limited analysis with the
threat model
Lu et
al. [24]
(2010)
VANET with a
social degree of
an intersection
vertex
Conditional privacy
preservation
Optimizing
vehicular DTN with
RSU assistance ;
Resisting privacy-
related attacks
on vehicle DTN
nodes ;
Achieving
conditional privacy
preservation
Opportunistic RSU-aided
packet forwarding
+Average delivery ratio
+Packet average delay
- Limited consideration of
routing requirements
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Li et al.
[9]
(2008)
VANET User privacy
preservation
Achieving
conditional privacy
preservation based
on a lightweight
authenticated key
establishment
scheme
Handling new vehicles,
roadside devices, and
service providers ;
Scenario 1: secure
communications between
vehicles ;
Scenario 2: secure
communications between
vehicles and roadside
devices ;
Scenario 3: a secure and
efficient communication
scheme with privacy
preservation
+Computational overhead
+Communication overhead
+Storage overhead
- Limited consideration of
routing requirements
Rabieh
et al.
[26]
VANET with a
centralized au-
thority
Interest privacy Protects the interest
privacy from other
vehicles who don’t
have the same inter-
est
Chatting request packet ;
Chatting response packet ;
Degree of interest verifica-
tion ;
Interest revocation
+Computational overhead
+Communication overhead
- Limited analysis with the
threat model
-No comparison with other
protocols
- Mobility models are not
considered
- Location privacy is not
considered
Yu et
al. [29]
(2016)
VANET with
data center and
a collection
of social spots
(including
Global Social
Spot and
Individual
Social Spot )
Location privacy Exploit the meeting
opportunities
for pseudonym
changing ;
Improve the
location privacy
preservation
System initialization and
key generation ;
Group join ;
Pseudonyms exchanging ;
RSU signing protocol ;
Group leaving ;
Revocation protocol ;
Conditional tracking
+Global pseudonym
entropy of the entire VSN
+Expected and actual
pseudonym entropy of a
target vehicle
+ Comparison with existing
schemes
+ Analysis with the threat
model
-Many assumptions
needed to understand
implementation
TABLE XIII
MODELS OF SOCIAL SPOTS
Scheme Model Idea
SPF protocol [18] (2010)
STAP protocol [13] (2011)
Social spot integrated
with RSU
Store packets in packet for-
warding
PCS strategy [28] (2012)
Scheme [16] (2011)
Small social spot and
large social spot
Vehicle changes its pseudonym
at social spot
MixGroup [29] (2016) Global social spot and
individual social spot
Exploit the meeting opportuni-
ties for pseudonym changing
VI. PRIVACY-PRESERVING SCHEMES FOR VSNS
In this section, we in-detail examine nineteen privacy-preserving schemes developed for or applied in the context of VSNs.
Based on the network model, we classify these schemes in three categories, including, social spots, location-based services,
and service-oriented sociality. In addition, these schemes as shown in Tab. XII are published between 2008 and 2016.
A. Network model with social spots
The idea of placing social spots in VANET networks has emerged as an important research area, which is referred to as the
locations where many vehicles will visit, for example, a sports complex, or a parking [103]. As shown in Tab. XIII, there are
three models of social spots, including, 1) social spot integrated with RSU, 2) small social spot and large social spot, and 3)
global social spot and individual social spot. In [28], the work developed a strategy called PCS, which consider the VANET
with a collection of social spots in order to facilitate vehicles to achieve high-level location preservation. To preserving the
location privacy, the PCS strategy uses three main phases, namely, key generation, pseudonym self-delegated generation, and
conditional tracking. The PCS strategy is efficient in terms of anonymity set size and location privacy gain. In addition, the
feasibility is proved using game-theoretic techniques but the authors conducted a limited analysis of the different threat models.
Similarly to the PCS strategy, Lin et al. in [13] developed a protocol called STAP. The STAP protocol considers social-tier-
assisted VANET network. With the assistance of social spot, STAP is not only very efficient in terms of packet delivery ratio
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and packet average delay, but also can preserves the location privacy. In order to unveil the asymptotic performance limits in
MSN, the work in [104] can be applied in this category. In [16], Lu et al. proposed a social spot based pseudonyms changing
technique, which considers VANET with a collection of social spots (including small social spot and large social spot). In
addition, Lu et al. [16] proposed a protocol called SPF. The SPF protocol achieving the location privacy based “Sacrificing
the Plum Tree for the Peach Tree” tactic. The SPF protocol is efficient in terms of average packet delivery ratio and average
packet delay, but lacks comparison with similar protocols.
The MixGroup scheme in [29] is a recent interesting work, which considers a VANET with data center and a collection of
social spots (including Global Social Spot and Individual Social Spot). With the assistance of social spot, MixGroup is not
only very efficient for pseudonym changing, but also can improve the location privacy preservation of the users.
B. Network model with location-based services
The location-based services play an important role in ad hoc social networks [46], [42]. In [25], Lu et al. developed a
scheme called DIKE, which considers a typical location-based service in VANET. Using the cooperative key update with
V-2-V communication, the DIKE scheme can preserve forward secrecy, backward secrecy, and collusion resistance. During
each key update procedure, DIKE is efficient in terms of key update delay and key update ratio.
The applications services such as parking are very important in VANET [105], [106]. Lu et al. in [12] consider VANET
with a large number of parking spaces. The work [12] developed an intelligent parking method that can be applied to large
parking lots, which can support privacy-preserving of the drivers information. In addition, the work [12] is efficient in term
of searching time delay. In a similar work Xiong et al. in [34] considering a VANET with a member manager, developed a
protocol to support multi-level conditional privacy. This protocol is efficient in terms of storage requirements and computational
overhead..
For solving the issues of authentication with privacy, Dong et al. in [39] proposed a scheme, called EP2DF, which considers
VANET with a lite certificate authority. EP2DF is based on two cryptosystems, including, 1) lite-CA-based public key
cryptosystem and 2) identity-based public key cryptosystem. The lite-CA-based public key cryptosystem is proposed specially
to achieve lightweight public key certificate management. In addition, EP2DF is efficient in terms of encryption cost comparison
and computational cost comparison. Related to EP2DF, Sun et al. [15] proposed a scheme called PASS, which it is efficient
in terms of revocation overhead, certificate updating overhead, and authentication overhead. In addition, PASS is efficient
compared to other schemes like ECPP scheme [60] and DCS scheme [107].
C. Network model with service-oriented sociality
The modeling of service-oriented sociality is based on a set of intersection nodes. Lu et al. in [24] proposed a scheme called
SPRING and introduces the Social Degree of an intersection vertex in VANET, which is used for the optimal deployment
of RSUs. In addition, the work in [24] proposes a method that optimizes vehicular DTN with RSU assistance. The SPRING
scheme is efficient in terms of average delivery ratio and packet average delay. On the other hand, the FLIP scheme in [21]
considers a VANET without the assistance of RSUs, which not only facilitates vehicles to communicate any common interest
but can also protect the interest privacy from other vehicles who don’t share the same interest. FLIP is efficient in terms of
average delay for finding the like-minded vehicle.
Since the GPS integration into vehicles, each vehicle in a VANET can find the geographically shortest route based on a
local map database [108]. Using social interplay, the NextCell scheme [109] can predict the location of a user from cell phone
traces. However, obtaining an accurate position with privacy-preserving is very important for vehicle applications. Chim et
al. in [20] proposed VSPN scheme, which can guide vehicles to desired destinations in a distributed manner and support
privacy-preserving of the drivers. VSPN is efficient in terms of processing delay and reduction in travelling time.
Based on the VANET communications, Li et al. in [9] develop a schema called SECSPP and characterize the security in
VANET by three scenarios, including, 1) secure communications between vehicles, 2) secure communications between vehicles
and roadside devices, 3) a secure and efficient communication scheme with privacy preservation. SECSPP scheme is efficient
in terms of computational overhead, communication overhead, and storage overhead. The scheme in [31] using a similar
idea, proposed three authentication scenarios, namely, V2R and R2V authentication, V2V authentication, and cross-RSU V2V
authentication.
Based on the state transition diagram in [10] for pseudonym generation, PACP scheme can solve the issues of authentication
and privacy in VANET such as low pseudonym generation latency, high scalability, and easy revocation. In addition, PACP is
efficient in terms of protocol latency analysis and comparison of search times for revocation. Related to PACP, SPECS scheme
in [36] is efficient in terms of data transmission and invalid batch successful rate. On the other hand, the PPBMA scheme in
[11] considers the link layer in privacy preserving broadcast message. PPBMA is efficient in terms of link layer delay and
data packet delay.
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Fig. 7. (a) Publication per year, (b) Number of papers vs. privacy models, (c) Number of papers vs. network models, and (d) Number of papers vs. general
categories
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The average date of publication of the surveyed papers is 2012, as shown in Fig. 7 (a). However, 70% of these papers focus
on three privacy models, namely, location privacy, identity privacy, and anonymity, as shown in Fig. 7 (b). For network models
in MSNs and VSNs, most papers use service-oriented social, social spots, and location-based services, as shown in Fig. 7 (c).
As shown in Fig. 7 (d), manipulation-based attacks are less considered and 95% of the surveyed papers use both public-key
algorithms and unkeyed algorithms. In addition, only seven papers use four types of game theory approach, namely, static
game, cooperation game, sequence games, and traceability game.
In the remainder of this section, we will discuss four open issues for ad hoc social networks, including, privacy preserving
methods, interdependent privacy, combination of privacy metrics, and identification of areas of vulnerability.
A. Privacy-preserving methods
We recommend three privacy-preserving methods, namely, 1) privacy-preserving energy consumption, 2) privacy preservation
for V2G social networks, and 3) privacy preservation for social internet of vehicles.
• Privacy-preserving energy consumption: Privacy-preserving energy consumption is an open issue in ad hoc social
networks. There are several research works addressing energy problems in ad hoc networks [110]. Based on optimal
numbers of clusters, Ali et al. in [110] proposed an algorithm called MOPSO to manage the resources in order to make
the MANET energy-efficient. A recent idea of Maglaras et al. in [111] can improve the use of social clusters based
on semi-markov processes. Therefore, how to manage energy consumption under social clustering of nodes in ad hoc
networks? Hence, privacy-preserving energy consumption is one of the future works.
• Privacy preservation for V2G social networks: A recent survey published in 2016 [112] review the state of the art of
privacy-preserving schemes for V2G networks in smart grid, none of them carries study for the social characteristics in
V2G networks. The future works addressing the limitations of privacy-preserving schemes for V2G networks will have
an important contribution for V2G social networks.
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• Privacy preservation for social internet of vehicles: Privacy preservation for social internet of vehicles (SIoV) is an
open issue that we are working on [113]. Since the SIoV is a combination of social and vehicular networks, the future
works addressing the limitations from both domains will have an important contribution for the SIoV.
B. Interdepedent privacy
Interdependent privacy refers to situations where the privacy of individual users is affected by the decisions of others [114].
Especially in social networks, where the interaction among different entities is constant and when talking for VSNs these
entities are unknown [113] the interdependent privacy is playing a key role. One excellent example of privacy interdependence
is the Facebook application platform. How well a user can protect his privacy from third party developers depends not only
on his decisions, but also on the decisions of his friends. New applications that are based on the social concept of vehicular
networking, like Navitweet [115] and Caravan Track [116] combined with traditional OSNs can create new privacy threats for
the users.
C. Combination of privacy metrics
New privacy-enhancing technologies and those resulting from combinations of existing technologies need to be evaluated
thoroughly to make sure that they provide an adequate amount of privacy. Because the VSN is a combination of social and
vehicular networks, evaluations need to use a selection of privacy metrics from both domains [117].
D. Identification of areas of vulnerability
Since we are moving to the ear of IoT, a data breach from a system can be initiated from an attack that has occurred
on another system that is somehow interconnected with it. For example in a VSN, an attack to a weak node can initiate
malware propagation to the rest of the network, which is very difficult to detect and stop [118]. A smart vehicle with an out
of date software [119] or an unprotected RSU can play the role of the weak node when an attack can be initiated. The US
Department of Defense use the CARVER assessment method to determine criticality and vulnerability in enemy infrastructures.
In a MSN/VSN the identification of critical nodes could help apply different privacy technologies according to how vulnerable
each entity is. Therefore, research in vulnerability identification is needed in order to handle the complexity and heterogeneity
of modern Ad Hoc social networks.
Although new sophisticated privacy metrics are needed, along with thorough analysis of the system in order to spot the weak
players, no privacy metric is efficient if the human factor is neglected [120]. Organizations and society continue to be affected
by both regular and similar cyber security breaches. These breaches pertain to technical implementations as well as routine
processing of confidential electronic information. Despite this range of activities, it has been proven that half of these have
human error at their core [121] and human aspects of cyber security must be taken into account when building new security
and privacy mechanisms. Recently the idea of quantum cryptographic approaches for privacy preserving in cloud [122] and
wireless systems [123] were introduced. Quantum cryptographic techniques provide an additional layer of security and privacy
preservation of the system. Therefore, research in quantum privacy approaches is needed to handle the various attacks that
MSNs and VSNs face. Although there exist simulator framework that combine many different simulators in order to better
represent reality [124], the evaluation of the proposed metrics on real environments is also an open issue especially for VSNs
where real deployments are limited.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we surveyed the state-of-the-art of privacy-preserving schemes for both MSNs and VSNs. We presented
the major privacy models, including, location privacy, identity privacy, anonymity, traceability, interest privacy, backward
privacy, and content oriented privacy. We also presented the major threats including, identity-based attacks, location-based
attacks, eavesdropping-based attacks, manipulation-based attacks, and service-based attacks. We reviewed the countermeasures
and game theoretic models proposed for MSN and VSN privacy preservation. We presented a side-by-side comparison in a
tabular form for the current state-of-the-art of privacy-preserving schemes (thirty-three) proposed for MSN and VSN. Privacy
preservation in MSNs and VSNs remains a challenging problem since adversaries can find different ways for exploiting
vulnerabilites of the system. As we move to the IoT era, privacy preservation of a network cannot be treated in isolation
but interedepedencies among users and networks must be taken into account. The correct identification of vulenrabilites of
the system and the combincation of privacy metrics can improve the protection of the system, but no countermeasure can be
effective if the human factor is neglected.
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